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Why	a	separate	citizens’	rights	agreement	under	article	50	is	required		The	European	Council	Guidelines	for	the	Brexit	negotiation	adopted	on	29th	April	2017	(further	referred	to	as	Negotiation	Guidelines),	as	well	as	the	Council	Directives	for	the	negotiation	adopted	on	22nd	May	2017	(further	referred	to	as	Negotiation	Directives),	show	a	clear	EU	commitment	to	defend	the	rights	of	the	nearly	five	million	people	whose	lives	are	most	directly	affected	by	Brexit,	namely	the	EU	citizens	residing	in	the	UK	and	British	citizens	residing	in	the	EU.			The	Negotiation	Directives	clearly	state	that	the	withdrawal	negotiations	should	ensure		‘the	necessary	effective,	enforceable,	non-discriminatory	and	comprehensive	guarantees’	and	they	favor	a	rather	maximalist	defense	of	the	rights	of	these	citizens	(including	judicial	protection	by	the	CJEU).			The	UK’s	promises	to	protect	the	rights	of	these	citizens	are	comparatively	vague.		However,	both	the	EU	and	the	UK	have	agreed	that	dealing	with	the	rights	of	these	citizens	is	the	first	priority	of	negotiations.	However,	there	is	no	procedural	guarantee	that	these	citizens	would	not	end	up	as	a	bargaining	chip.				The	Negotiation	Guidelines	and	Directives	provide	a	phased	approach	to	the	negotiations.		However,	this	phased	approach	aims	primarily	at	separating	the	negotiation	of	the	withdrawal	settlement	under	Article	50TEU	(phase	1)	from	the	negotiation	of	an	agreement	on	the	future	relationship	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	(phase	2).		In	addition	to	that	it	provides	for	a	second	stage	within	the	first	phase	(Article	50	withdrawal	settlement).		In	that	second	stage,	the	withdrawal	negotiation	can	start	to	reflect	on	the	potential	scenarios	for	the	future	UK-EU	relationship.		Article	50	requires		‘taking	account	of	the	framework	for	its	[withdrawing	Member	State’s]	future	relationship	with	the	Union’	when	dealing	with	the	withdrawal	agreement.		However,	the	Guidelines	state	clearly	that	this	second	stage	of	the	first	phase	will	only	start	when	the	European	Council	has	decided	that	there	is	‘sufficient	progress’	on	the	issues	identified	as	priorities	of	the	first	phase.		Citizens’	rights	have	been	identified	as	the	first	item	on	the	agenda	of	the	first	phase	of	the	negotiation	process.			The	proposed	‘phasing’	thus	gives	some	level	of	separating	citizens’	rights	from	other	parts	of	the	negotiation.		However,	this	is	far	from	ring-fencing.			The	EU	has	taken	the	approach	that	as	far	as	the	
withdrawal	issues	(phase	1)	are	concerned	‘nothing	is	agreed	until	everything	is	agreed’.	This	means	at	least	that	citizens’	rights	issues	might	be	traded	off	against	other	topics	of	the	first	phase	of	negotiation,	such	as	the	financial	settlement	and	the	Ireland-Northern	Ireland	border	issue.			Moreover,	they	may	even	be	influenced	by	the	reflections	about	the	future	UK-EU	relationship	which	will	appear	on	the	negotiation	table	as	issues	‘to	be	taken	into	account’	prior	to	the	finalisation	of	the	Article	50	withdrawal	agreement.			Hence,	EU	citizens	in	the	UK	and	British	in	the	EU	remain	fully	at	risk	of	becoming	bargaining	chips.		The	proposed	negotiation	procedure	entails	two	additional	dramatic	consequences	for	the	4.5	million	citizens	directly	affected.		The	principle	‘nothing	is	agreed	until	everything	is	agreed’	prolongs	unnecessarily	the	uncertainty	these	people	are	living	in.			Moreover,	in	the	case	the	withdrawal	agreement	fails,	citizens	will	find	themselves	in	a	legal	limbo	with	dramatic	consequences.		The	only	solution	to	solve	the	uncertainty	of	4.5	million	people	is	to	adopt	an	agreement	on	citizen’s	rights	at	the	start	of	the	Article	50	negotiation,	independently	from	other	withdrawal	issues.	So	why	has	it	so	far	not	happened?	One	can	understand	the	EU’s	reluctance	to	negotiate	on	citizens’	rights	PRIOR	to	the	triggering	of	Article	50.			The	UK	referendum	was	merely	an	internal	affair	as	long	as	Article	50	had	not	been	triggered.			Moreover,	if	negotiating	a	citizens’	rights	agreement	prior	to	Article	50	had	been		attempted,	it	would	not	have	profited	from	the	decision-making	procedure	of	Article	50	(which	allows	for	the	agreement	to	be	adopted	via	Qualified	Majority	in	Council	and	consent	by	the	EP,	and	thus	not	requiring	ratification	by	national	parliaments	in	the	EU	27).	Negotiation	outside	Article	50	would	be	more	cumbersome	since	it	may	require	ratification	by	all	national	parliaments.			Hence,	the	‘time	advantage’	of	starting	negotiation	prior	to	triggering	Article	50,	would	immediately	have	been	lost	as	the	procedure	itself	would	slow	down	the	process.			Finally,	the	EU	feared	that	negotiation	on	partial	issues	prior	to	the	triggering	of	Article	50	would	undermine	the	unity	of	the	EU	27.				However,	now	that		Article	50	has	been	triggered,	there	is	no	reason	why	a	separate	agreement	on	citizens’	rights	cannot	be	negotiated	prior	to	all	other	issues.			The	moral	argument	in	favor	of	that	remains	as	strong	as	ever	before.		The	strategic	argument	of	the	EU	that	it	would	encourage	‘cherry-picking’	is	also	hardly	convincing.		The	EU	has	set	out	by	now	its	institutional	framework,	priorities	and	strategy	for	the	negotiations.		It	is	no	longer	unprepared	and	has	the	institutional	mechanism	in	place	to	ensure	unity	in	response	to	the	UK	in	negotiations.		Moreover,	arguments	that	a	separate	citizens	rights	agreement	opens	the	way	for	cherry-picking	are	based	on	the	wrong	assumption.		Accepting	ring-fencing	for	citizens’	rights	does	not	create	any	obligation	to	do	the	same	for	other	issues.		There	is	a	strong	moral	argument	to	state:	‘a	separate	agreement	will	only	be	done	on	citizens’	rights	given	the	human	costs	involved’.		As	will	be	shown	below;	that	does	not	create	any	legal	precedent	for	the	EU	to	accept	separate	agreements	on	other	issues.					
The	only	remaining	question	then	is	whether	it	is	legally	possible.	More	precisely,	the	question	is	whether	the	rights	of	post-Brexit	EU	citizens	can	be	legally	ring-fenced	from	other	negotiation	topics	and	be	safeguarded	prior	to	the	end	of	the	withdrawal	negotiation	and	in	a	way	that	it	stands	even	in	failure	of	the	latter.	To	show	whether	ring-fencing	is	legally	possible	we	need	to	address	three	questions:	1) Is	it	possible	to	adopt	a	separate	agreement	on	citizens	rights	signed	under	Article	50?	2) How	to	ensure	procedurally	that	the	negotiation	of	these	citizens’	rights,	and	of	this	separate	agreement,	is	not	mixed	up	with	other	Brexit	negotiation	issues	(ring-fencing	in	the	strict	sense).	3) How	to	ensure	that	the		agreement	comes	into	force	even	if	other	aspects	of	the	Brexit	negotiation	fail	(safeguarding)						
Is	a	separate	agreement	legally	possible	under	Article	50	TEU?			As	confirmed	in	Article	5	of	the	Negotiation	Guidelines,	Article	50	TEU	confers	on	the	Union	an	‘exceptional	horizontal	competence	to	cover	in	this	agreement	all	matters	necessary	to	arrange	the	withdrawal.	This	exceptional	competence	is	of	a	one-off	nature	and	strictly	for	the	purposes	of	arranging	the	withdrawal	from	the	Union.’	There	is	no	doubt	that	addressing	the	rights	of	the	4.5	million	is	inherently	an	issue	of	withdrawal	and	can	thus	be	dealt	with	via	Article	50.			These	are	issues	on	which	the	EU	has	been	able	to	act	on	behalf	on	the	Member	States	so	far,	and	this	competence	extends	(thanks	to	Article	50)	to	dealing	with	all	withdrawal	aspects	related	to	it.					However,	Article	50	TEU	talks	about	a	withdrawal	agreement	in	the	singular.		The	question	is	then	whether	a	separate	agreement	on	citizens’	right	under	Article	50	is	possible.		I	will	argue	that	the	use	of	the	singular	in	relation	to	‘agreement’,	does	not	exclude	legally	that	the	withdrawal	could	be	composed	of	several	agreements,	as	long	as	the	objectives	and	spirit	of	Article	50	TEU	are	respected.			
Interpretation	method	common	to	the	Member	States?		It	is	first	worth	pointing	out	that	interpreting	the	singular	in	the	plural	(and	vice	versa)	is	not	an	unusual	legal	interpretation	technique.		In	some	jurisdictions,	this	option	is	even	set	out	as	a	general	interpretation	rule	by	statute.	The	UK	Interpretation	Act	of	1978,	for	instance,	states	in	section	6(c)	that	‘in	any	Act,	unless	the	contrary	intention	appears,	words	in	the	singular	include	the	plural	and	words	in	the	plural	include	the	singular’.		Part	III,	Article	11(a)	of	the	Irish	Interpretation	Act	of	1937,	equally	states	that	‘every	word	importing	the	singular	shall,	unless	the	contrary	intention	appears,	be	construed	as	if	it	also	imported	the	plural,	and	every	word	importing	the	plural	shall,	unless	the	contrary	intention	appears,	be	construed	as	if	it	also	imported	the	singular’.			
The	EU	does	not	have	a	generic	interpretation	act	like	the	UK	or	Ireland.	However,	to	interpret	EU	law	the	CJEU	can	rely	on	common	ground	in	national	legal	traditions.			In	Brasserie	du	Pêcheur	and	Factortame,	for	instance,	the	Court	made	clear	that	‘it	is	for	the	[CJEU],	in	pursuance	of	the	task	conferred	on	it	by	Article	[19	TEU]	of	ensuring	that	in	the	interpretation	and	application	of	the	Treaty	the	law	is	observed,	to	rule	on	such	a	question	in	accordance	with	
generally	accepted	methods	of	interpretation,	in	particular	by	reference	to	the	fundamental	principles	of	the	[EU]	legal	system	and,	where	necessary,	general	
principles	common	to	the	legal	systems	of	the	Member	States’1	(emphasis	added).	The	case	law	and	academic	analysis	has	mainly	focused	on	‘general	principles	common	to	the	legal	systems	of	the	Member	States’,	particularly	in	relationship	to	fundamental	rights,	rather	than	on	the	broader	concept	of	‘generally	accepted	methods	of	interpretation’.		Yet,	if	the	CJEU	were	to	refer	to	the	concept	of	generally	accepted	method	of	interpretation	or	principles	common	to	the	legal	systems	of	the	Member	States,	it	will	not	simply	derive	from	a	comparative	study	a	mean,	more	or	less	arithmetic.		As	Miguel	Poiares	Maduro	argues,	‘it	is	not	simply	a	question	of	determining	what	legal	solution	is	common	to	the	national	legal	orders.	It	is	also,	or	mostly,	a	question	of	determining	what	legal	solution	fits	better	with	the	EU	legal	order	(in	the	light	of	its	broader	set	of	rules	and	principles	and	of	its	context	of	application).	Comparative	law	becomes,	in	this	way,	one	more	instrument	of	what	is	the	prevailing	technique	of	interpretation	at	the	Court:	teleological	interpretation.’2			
Teleological	interpretation		As	the	President	of	the	CJEU,	Koen	Lenaerts,	states,	writing	academically	and	with	reference	to	Advocate	General	Fennelly	‘the	characteristic	element	in	the	[CJEU]’s	interpretative	method	is	[…]	the	so-called	‘teleological”	approach’.3		Rather	than	necessarily	sticking	to	a	literal	interpretation,	the	teleological	or	purposive	interpretation	looks	to	the	objectives	and	context	of	a	legal	provision.		One	of	the	reasons	why	teleological	interpretation	is	so	popular	in	the	CJEU	is	that	all	official	languages	of	the	EU	are	equally	valid.	As	each	language	comes	with	nuances	and	contextual	background	and	translation	is	no	absolute	science,	legal	interpretation	that	aims	at	coherence	by	looking	into	objectives	and	legal	context	of	provisions	is	often	more	preferable	than	sticking	to	literal	interpretation.			The	teleological	interpretation	of	the	CJEU	is	also	a	meta-purposive	
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interpretation.	4			It	does	not	refer	exclusively	to	a	purposive	interpretation	of	the	relevant	legal	rule,	but	places	this	interpretation	in	the	wider	context	of	a	systematic	understanding	of	the	EU	legal	order.	Purposive	interpretation	is	part	of	a	constitutionalizing	and	integrationist	understanding	of	the	European	legal	order.		Legal	rules	have	to	be	understood	in	the	context	of	the	wider	objectives	and	institutional	balances	provided	by	the	EU	Treaties	and	the	autonomy	of	the	EU	legal	order.	In	this	tradition	of	teleological	interpretation	it	is	extremely	unlikely	that	the	CJEU	would	adopt	a	strict	literal	interpretation	of	Article	50	if	it	were	asked	whether	‘an	agreement’	can	be	interpreted	in	the	plural.		This	is	even	more	so	as	Article	50	is	a	brief	provision	that	can	hardly	be	said	to	provide	a	comprehensive	solution	to	the	process	of	withdrawal	of	a	Member	State.	At	the	same	time,	from	a	teleological	viewpoint,	the	adoption	of	a	separate	citizens’	rights	agreement	under	Article	50	corresponds	with	the	objectives	and	spirit	of	Article	50,	as	well	as	the	broader	objectives	and	integrationist	logic	of	the	Treaties.		To	understand	the	objectives	and	spirit	of	Article	50,	one	has	to	look	at	how	it	was	drafted,	to	interpret	it	in	line	with	and	in	light	of	the	Treaties,	and	understand	the	institutional	and	negotiation	balance	it	provides.		Article	50	TEU	is	characterised	by	two	main	features.	On	the	one	hand,	it	confirms	the	right	of	a	Member	State	to	withdraw	and	encourages	a	negotiated	withdrawal	outcome.		On	the	other	hand,	it	sets	out	a	balance	of	power	in	the	negotiations	that	is	tilted	in	favour	of	the	EU27	in	order	to	defend	the	general	interest	of	the	EU	and	the	objectives	of	the	Treaties.			The	idea	of	a	‘withdrawal	article’	was	first	discussed	in	the	Convention	preparing	the	Constitutional	Treaty	(Article	I-60	of	that	text),	and	following	failure	of	the	latter	subsequently	introduced	as	Article	50	TEU	by	the	Lisbon	Treaty.			According	to	Lord	Kerr,	the	Secretary-General	of	the	Convention,	the	article	was	partially	inspired	by	an	intention	to	undermine	the	false	argument	of	Eurosceptics,	particularly	in	Britain,	that	the	EU	had	imprisoned	Member	States	towards	‘ever	closer	union’	without	any	way	to	get	out	of	it.5		Although	that	claim	was	legally	unnecessary	(as	international	law	allows	a	Member	State	to	withdraw),	a	clear	statement	in	the	EU	Treaties	would	undermine	the	false	accusation.		At	the	same	time,	it	was	feared	that	an	authoritarian	leader	would	come	to	power	in	a	Member	State	and	take	the	country	out	of	the	EU	without	any	transitional	legal	solutions.6		The	article	therefore	confirms	the	right	to	leave	the	EU	while	introducing	a	procedure	aimed	at	a	negotiated	outcome.			Hillion7	and	Syrpis8	argue	that	
																																																								4	Miguel	Poiares	Maduro,	ibid.	5	‘Article	50	author	Lord	Kerr:	I	didn’t	have	UK	in	mind’	in	Politico	EU,	at	http://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-article-50-lord-kerr-john-kerr/	6	Ibid.	7	C	Hillion,	‘Accession	and	Withdrawal	in	the	Law	of	the	European	Union’	in	A	Arnull	and	D	Chalmers	(eds),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	European	Union	Law	(OUP,	2015)	126	at	150-51.	8	Phil	Syrpis,’What	next?	An	analysis	of	the	EU	law	questions	surrounding	Article	50	TEU:	Part	One’,	Blogpost	in	EUtopialaw,	(posted	8	July	2016),	at	
Article	50	has	a	specific	function	in	relation	to	the	integration	process	in	that	it	‘bolsters	the	normative	basis	for	a	negotiated	withdrawal’	and	‘points	towards	a	strong	post-withdrawal	engagement	by	the	Union	with	the	former	Member	State’.	At	the	same	time,	Article	50	sets	out	a	balance	of	power	that	favours	the	EU27	over	the	withdrawing	Member	State	during	the	negotiation.9		Article	50	requires	the	remaining	member	states	to	adopt	via	the	European	Council	(minus	withdrawing	state)	guidelines	for	the	negotiation.		In	theory	these	are	guidelines	for	the	negotiation	by	the	remaining	27,	but	in	practice	these	are	likely	to	set	out	the	rules	of	procedure	for	the	negotiation	as	a	whole,	since	a	withdrawing	state	is	not	very	likely	to	be	in	a	strong	enough	economic	bargaining	position	to	impose	its	preferred	rules	of	procedure.			Most	importantly,	Article	50	paragraph	3	introduces	a	‘guillotine	clause’;	once	a	Member	State	has	decided	its	withdrawal	and	notified	the	European	Council,	the	2	year	period	of	paragraph	3	is	triggered,	which	leads	to	either	a	negotiated	agreement,	or,	failing	that,	automatic	exit,	unless	the	European	Council,	by	unanimity	decides	to	extend	the	negotiation	period.		For	the	withdrawing	Member	State	there	is	much	more	at	stake	than	for	the	other	Member	States.	Failing	to	reach	an	agreement	means	that	the	exiting	country	will	fall	back	on	standard	WTO	rules,	while	the	cost	for	the	remaining	Member	States	of	an	exit	without	agreement	will	be	shared	between	27	Member	States.	The	threat	of	an	automatic	non-negotiated	exit	therefore	favors	the	bargaining	position	of	the	rest	of	the	EU.	Hence,	Article	50	is		crafted	so	that	it	aims	at	a	negotiated	outcome	but	provides	at	the	same	time	an	institutional	set-up	and	negotiation	balance	that	should	ensure	that	the	general	interests	of	the	EU	and	objectives	of	the	Treaties	are	not	compromised	via	the	withdrawal	process.			The	question	is	then	whether		a	separate	citizens’	rights	agreement	respects	the	objectives	and	spirit	of	Article	50	and	general	scheme	of	the	Treaties?			As	both	the	EU27	and	UK	agree	on	the	priority	of	dealing	with	the	citizens’	rights	post-Brexit,	it	obviously	corresponds	to	the	Article’s	objective	to	come	to	a	negotiated	solution.		At	the	same	time,	it	does	not	undermine	the	power	balance	set	out	in	the	article.			Accepting	a	separate	agreement	on	citizenship	rights	does	not	imply	other	topics	of	the	Brexit	negotiations	can	be	dealt	with	in	several	agreements.		There	is	a	strong	moral	argument	to	claim	that	citizens’	rights	are	unique	given	the	human	consequences	they	entail	and	therefore	deserve	being	ring-fenced	from	other	negotiation	issues.		Moreover,	accepting	such	a	separate	deal	does	not	create	any	legal	precedent	for	accepting	such	deals	on	other	issues.		It	is	for	the	European	Council	(EU27)	to	set	out	(and	amend)	the	negotiation	Guidelines,	and	it	is	fully	empowered	to	state	that	only	a	citizens’	rights	agreement	can	be	negotiated	separately.			Hence,	accepting	a	separate	citizens’	rights	agreement	does	not	undermine	the	balance	of	power	set	out	in	Article	50.		Fears	that																																																																																																																																																															https://eutopialaw.com/2016/07/08/what-next-an-analysis-of-the-eu-law-questions-surrounding-article-50-teu-part-one/	9	See	also	Nick	Barber,	Tom	Hickman	and	Jeff	King:	Pulling	the	Article	50	‘Trigger’:	Parliament’s	Indispensable	Role.	UK	Constitutional	Law	Blog	(posted		(27th	Jun	2016)	(available	at	https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/).		
accepting	a	citizens’	rights	agreement	would	undermine	the	EU’s	bargaining	position	because	the	UK	favours	an	approach	of	negotiation	separate	sectoral	agreements	(in	which	it	assumes	it	has	more	leeway	to	play	out	the	divisions	among	the	remaining	Member	States)	are	unjustified.			The	EU	remains	in	the	political	and	legal	position	to	refuse	any	sectoral	approach	on	other	issues,	even	if	it	has	accepted	a	citizens’	rights	agreement.		The	only	qualification	that	has	to	be	made	is	that	in	order	to	respect	the	institutional	balance	of	Article	50,	a	separate	citizens’	rights	agreement	signed	prior	to	the	rest	of	the	withdrawal	agreement	would	need	to	include	a	clause	that	signature	of	the	agreement	alone	does	not	constitute	the	end	of	the	2	year	negotiation	period	provided	in	the	article.				Allowing	a	separate	citizens’	agreement	under	Article	50	also	fits	with	a	meta-purposive	understanding	of	the	article.		The	CJEU	has	been	proactive	in	establishing	the	EU	legal	order	by	teleological	interpretation	establishing	principles	such	as	supremacy	and	direct	effect.			European	citizenship	is	another	core	principle	that	reinforces	the	autonomy	of	the	EU	legal	order	and	integrationist	direction	of	the	EU,	and	CJEU	case	law	has	been	central	to	strengthening	European	citizenship.				At	the	same	time,	European	citizenship	is	dependent	on	national	citizenship.		The	vulnerability	of	EU	citizenship	comes	dramatically	to	the	fore	in	the	case	of	withdrawal	of	a	Member	State	from	the	Union.		Millions	of	citizens	risk	losing	overnight	a	comprehensive	set	of	rights,	on	which	many	have	built	their	lives.		As	the	EU	loses	its	jurisdiction	over	the	former	Member	State	it	appears	powerless	to	uphold	the	protection	of	these	rights,	while	the	international	law	regime	of	‘acquired	rights’	offers	little	or	no	solution	either	for	those	who	have	‘built	up’	and	exercised	freedom	of	movement	rights.		The	only	way	in	which	the	EU	can	still	try	to	protect	these	citizens	is	via	the	negotiated	withdrawal	of	Article	50.		Hence,	as	a	separate	and	ring-fenced	agreement	on	citizens’	rights	under	Article	50	is	the	best	way	to	ensure	this	protection,	allowing	such	an	agreement	guarantees	the	realisation	of	the	wider	objectives	of	the	EU;	serving	the	interests	of	its	citizens	(Article	13(1)	TEU)	and	protecting	its	citizens	in	its	relations	with	the	wider	world	(Article	5	TEU).		By	way	of	allowing	a	separate	citizens’	rights	agreement	even	the	‘withdrawal	article	50’	can	realise	its	integrationist	potential;	giving	European	citizenship	a	meaning	as	a	set	of	acquired	rights	even	when	a	Member	State	leaves.	Allowing	a	separate	citizens’	rights	under	Article	50	(and	thus	not	sticking	to	a	literal	interpretation	of	‘agreement’	in	the	singular)	does	not	go	against	the	right	interpretation	of	that	Article,	but	is	the	best	way	to	realise	its	objectives	and	its	role	within	the	wider	objectives	and	integrationist	logic	of	the	Treaties.		
Procedurally	ring-fencing	from	other	negotiation	issues.		The	legal	possibility	to	sign	a	separate	citizens’	rights	agreement	under	Article	50	does	not	as	such	guarantee	that	negotiation	on	these	citizens’	rights		is	ring-fenced	from	all	other	negotiation	topics.			If	negotiation	on	other	issues	runs	in	parallel,	trade-offs	might	be	made,	which	would	still	turn	citizens	into	bargaining	chips.		Hence,	in	addition	to	the	question	whether	Article	50	allows	more	than	one	agreement,	we	have	to	address	the	question	of	timing	of	the	negotiations.		
How	can	one	procedurally	guarantee	that	negotiations	on	a	citizens’	rights	agreement	do	not	overlap	with	negotiations	on	other	Brexit	issues.		As	explained	above,	the	phased	timing	proposed	in	the	Negotiation	Guidelines	does	not	solve	the	risk	of	people	becoming	a	bargaining	chip.			At	best,	it	avoids	that	the	discussion	of	citizens’	rights	it	not	mixed	up	with	final	negotiations	on	the	future	(trade)	relationship	between	the	UK	and	the	EU.		Yet,	discussions	on	citizens’	rights	would	take	place	together	with	discussions	on	the	other	withdrawal	topics	of	phase	one,	such	as	the	financial	settlement.		Moreover,	in	the	proposed	scheme	of	the	Guidelines,	discussion	on	citizen’s	rights	may	even	be	influenced	by	reflections	on	the	future	relationship	(in	stage	2	of	phase	1).			There	are	two	options	to	ensure	ring-fencing	and	avoiding	citizens	become	a	bargaining	chip.		‘Hard	ring-fencing’	requires	that	the	negotiation	and	signature	of	a	separate	citizenship	agreement	would	take	place	prior	to	any	other	topics	being	discussed.		In	addition	to	ring-fencing,	it	would	also	have	the	advantage	of	putting	negotiators	under	pressure	to	find	quickly	an	agreement	on	an	issue	which	all	parties	have	described	as	important.		If	successful,	it	is	also	more	likely	to	allow	sufficient	time	for	the	UK	Parliament	to	ratify	it	so	that	it	can	come	into	force	on	Brexit	day.	However,	given	the	short	time	frame	of	the	‘guillotine	clause’	of	Article	50,	paragraph	3,	there	may	not	be	much	appetite	to	adopt	this	approach;	particularly	since	several	months	of	the	two-year	period	have	already	been	lost	due	to	the	UK	general	election.			It	is	also	very	unlikely	that	the	European	Council	would	still	redraft	its	negotiations	guidelines	prior	to	starting	the	negotiations.		Yet,	‘soft	ring-fencing’	is	still	possible.		‘Soft	ring-fencing’	requires	that	a	citizens’	rights	agreement	is	negotiated	and	signed	(and	ratified)	prior	to	starting	the	second	stage	of	the	first	phase.	Thus	a	solution	on	citizens’	rights	will	need	to	be	agreed	prior	to	any	discussions	on	the	framework	of	a	potential	future	relationship	UK-EU	that	could	be	taken	into	account	in	the	withdrawal	negotiation	of	Article	50.			In	this	way,	citizens’	rights	might	still	be	mixed	up	with	other	first	phase	topics	such	as	the	financial	settlement,	but	they	would	not	be	mixed	up	with	any	considerations	about	the	future	relationship	UK-EU.		Such	‘soft	ring-fencing’	does	not	even	require	adjusting	the	phased	approach	of		the	current	Negotiation	Guidelines,	since	the	Council	can	simply	make	a	political	statement	that	in	order	for	it	to	conclude	that	there	is	sufficient	progress	on	the	first	stage,	it	will	require	that	there	is	a	signed	citizens’	rights	agreement.	It	will	require,	though,	an	adjustment	of	the	Guidelines	to	clarify	that	a	separate	citizenship	agreement	is	possible;	but,	as	Article	50	provides,	the	Council	can	adjust	its	Guidelines	whenever	it	deems	appropriate.		It	is	also	advisable	that	the	Council	does	not	simply	require	signature	but	also	ratification	in	the	UK	Parliament	of	the	citizens’	rights	agreement	prior	to	accepting	progress	to	stage	2	of	the	withdrawal	negotiations.		Otherwise,	EU	citizens	still	fall	short	of	guaranteed	protection	on	Brexit	day.			
A	‘partial	scope	withdrawal	agreement	with	safeguard	clause’	and	
‘consolidated	Brexit	agreement’	
	If	(soft)	ring-fencing	is	achieved,	a	citizens’	rights	agreement	will	be	signed	before	the	full	Article	50	withdrawal	agreement.			The	date	of	coming	into	force	is	best	set	for	Brexit	day.			On	EU	side,	the	agreement	is	adopted	by	qualified	majority	(QMV)	in	the	Council	and	consent	of	the	European	Parliament.	On	UK	side,	it	requires	ratification	by	the	UK	Parliament.			As	explained	above,	soft	ring-fencing	should	best	require	that	the	UK	ratifies	the	agreement	as	a	condition	to	proceed	to	stage	2	of	phase	1	of	the	negotiations.		The	agreement	would	constitute	a	‘partial	scope	Brexit	agreement’	and,	therefore,	would	need,	as	mentioned	above,	to	include	a	clause	that	clarifies	its	signature	does	not	stop	the	2	year	negotiation	period	of	Article	50.			The	citizens’	rights	agreement	will	also	need	to	include	a	‘safeguard	clause’,	stating	that	its	validity	is	not	dependent	upon	the	entry	into	force	of	any	other	agreement	to	be	concluded	under	Article	50	TEU.	So,	even	in	the	case	of	failure	of	any	other	withdrawal	Agreement	under	Article	50,	the	citizens’	rights	agreement	comes	into	force	on	Brexit	day.		It	would	then	de	facto	constitute	THE	(only)	Article	50	withdrawal	agreement.			In	the	case	the	rest	of	the	withdrawal	negotiation	is	also	successful,	this	withdrawal	agreement	of	Article	50	will	equally	require	QMV	in	Council	and	EP	consent	on	the	part	of	the	EU,	and	ratification	on	UK	side.			The	Commission	Legal	Service	could	subsequently	provide	a	consolidated	version	of	the	citizens’	rights	agreement	and	final	withdrawal	deal	as	one	single	text.					An	alternative	solution	is	for	the	final	withdrawal	agreement	to	copy	integrally	the	citizens’	rights	agreement,	which	would	be	adopted	by	QMV	in	Council	and	EP	Consent	on	the	one	hand,	and	UK	Parliament	ratification	on	the	other	hand.		However,			this	is	not	entirely	without	risk	as	it	would	require	the	UK	Parliament	again	to	reconsider	the	citizens’	rights	agreement	together	with	the	rest	of	the	Article	50	withdrawal	agreement.		
Conclusion		A	separate	citizens’	rights	agreement	under	Article	50	TEU	is	the	best	way	to	safeguard	the	rights	of	EU	citizens	residing	in	the	EK	and	British	citizens	in	the	EU.		A	soft	ring-fencing	mechanism	can	ensure	these	citizens	do	not	become	a	bargaining	chip	in	the	core	Brexit	negotiations,	while	providing	certainty	about	their	future	earlier	on	in	the	negotiation	process.		A	safeguard	clause	can	ensure	they	do	not	fall	into	a	legal	limbo	on	Brexit	day.		All	this	can	be	done	on	the	basis	of	a	teleological	interpretation	of	Article	50.		That	Article	50	talks	about	‘an	agreement’	in	the	singular	cannot	be	used	by	policy-makers	as	an	excuse	for	not	ring-fencing	the	rights	of	4.5	million	citizens.		The	moral	case	for	ring-fencing	is	beyond	doubt.	The	legal	solution	is	available.						
